Title

I. Introduction
The Boston Globe proclaimed, "The UN's coming of age". In the U.S. press, the war against Iraq was portrayed as a sign of revitalization and legitimation of the UN, which hadn't fought a war since Korea and hadn't mounted a significant military campaign since the Congo operation. It is distressing that projection of military force is considered to be the index of maturation, to the neglect of the establishment and substantial work of UN agencies, of the signing of global treaties, conventions, and covenants, of the resolutions and the development of international regimens like the New International Economic Order and the New International Information Order, of the case law in the International Court of Justice, of UN activities ranging over the spectrum of global and international affairs.
II. The Legitimacy of the War.
The legitimacy of the UN's role in the war can be no greater than the legitimacy of the war itself. The U.S. Congress is still exposing the illegal support, involving misappropriation of funds and financial guarantees to Iraq for nuclear weapon and military purposes, provided by the administration in the period preceding the war. The encouragement by the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, to seize at least part of Kuwait has been confirmed in documentation refuting her long-delayed denials before Congress, reluctantly provided after prolonged procrastination. In addition, there is suspicion that the provocative actions by Kuwait (prohibiting civilian overflights, slant-drilling into the Iraqi part of the Ramalla oil field, violating OPEC production quotas) were promoted by the CIA. Whether Iraq merely misinterpreted Bush's instructions, whether Bush deliberately encouraged Iraq to reannex Kuwait, which had been severed under British control, as a trap to allow Bush, his family, and oilmen cohorts to profit from the opportunity, and/or for the U.S. to obtain a petroleum stranglehold over trade competitors, Japan and Europe, or whether Thatcher convinced Bush to reverse course after their meeting is as difficult to determine as motivations are in general. Certainly, Kuwait, as a British imperial creation, had pro forma legitimation. The right of a British Civil Servant to "draw lines in the sand" to separate the masses of people from the oil wealth and to establish a compliant, pro-capitalist, repressive, religiously-intolerant, obscenely wealthy monarchy which engages in massive human rights violations and denies citizenship (and share of the oil wealth) even to peoples who have lived there for generations ("Bedoun") [Moorehead (1992) 12] is not generally questioned by current governments, which fear opening a "can of worms". Despite the complexity of the issues involved in challenging status quo borders and sacrosanct national sovereignty, economic justice, world peace, environmental, and other transnational problems demand that they be addressed.
Even were the view that the reannexation of Kuwait was a simple case of aggression and invasion of a legitimate sovereign state to be accepted, other problems of legitimacy of the war remain. Even the concept of "bellum justum" involves a weighing of means versus ends, costs and benefits. Furthermore, it is a question of "Whose costs?" and "Who benefits?" Let us try to distinguish the aspirations of the peoples of the world ("Common interests") from those whose interests ("Special interests") are represented by Bush and U.S. governments in general.
III.Common Interests vs. Special Interests.
The concept of "Common Heritages of Humanity", including non-renewable resources like petroleum, has long been promoted. What if Bush and the special interests had been willing to yield to the compulsion of geography, and to accept limited dismantling of imperial perogatives from the colonial era by conceding that Kuwait is the 19th province of Iraq--but what if the opportunity were used to obtain concessions for the common interest? Since Iraq was entrapped in an embarrassing pro forma violation of sovereignty, what if Bush had been willing to take advantage of the opportunity in which he had (perhaps unwittingly) entrapped Iraq to negotiate to secure access to part of the (yet to be declared) Common Heritage of Humanity, at minimum to the disputed oil in the Rumala field and in Kuwait, to be used for financial support for UN agencies, for regional development, and for domestic use? The potential revenues represent astronomical numbers compared to the UN budget. What if Bush supported the expansion of multi-ethnic, secular, religiously-tolerant, more democratic government (perhaps a constitutional monarchy as a compromise), and enhancement of human, trade union, and citizenship rights, especially for the Bedoun, and had been willing to exploit Iraq's embarrassment to those ends?; What if Bush had not been unalterably opposed to the dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (proposed by Iraq)? What if Bush had not opposed the removal of all troops from occupied territories (also proposed by Iraq on 12 August 1990 and again, in modified form, on 23 August 1990)? Bush preferred to initiate a war in the oilfields with its disastrous consequences in order to avoid all of these potential outcomes. In the process he also established U.S. military control over much of one of the world's most critical resources--oil. Given current direction, a replay of the imperial trade, resource, and market conflict called World War II, this time with the U.S.-led Western Hemisphere against a continental Europe led by Germany, and Asia-Pacific led by Japan, is not unthinkable.
Bush's "macho-style" in support of special interests depends upon brute force and war--to make others "cave-in" (as Bush put it) [Australian Financial Review (31 July 1992)]. Given his goals, diplomacy was inadequate, force was necessary. However, common interests are best (perhaps only) achievable through the rule of law, negotiation, and diplomacy--allowing credit for face-saving concessions. Were Iraq to have been allowed to take some of the credit for sharing oil wealth with the world community, allowed to take credit for advances in human rights, in democracy, in secularism, in religious tolerance, even in avoiding the ecological catastrophe of a war in the oil fields, likely much could have been accomplished through negotiation, which Iraq repeatedly suggested, especially given the embarrassing position into which Iraq was entrapped, but which Bush would not countenance--even when they did not emanate from Iraq [Chomsky (1990)]. Bush was intent upon having his war.
IV. UN Culpability and Mitigation.
There are several factors which mitigate UN culpability for the war and the consequent ecological disaster: It is only the Security Council [from which most UN members are excluded] which had authority and responsibility to provide legitimacy to warfare conducted by members. Resolution 678 authorized "all necessary means" by member states "to implement...Resolution 660...and to restore international peace...". Only advocates of "peace through war" philosophy could find authorization for war in Resolution 678, especially since Iraq had repeatedly offered to peacefully withdraw from Kuwait. What Bush found unacceptable in Iraq's proposals was the observance and uniform enforcement of long-violated UN Resolutions calling for the removal of military occupying forces in the Middle East (by Israel in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan), as well as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (in accordance with the first Resolution ever passed by the General Assembly). Furthermore, Resolution 678 could be considered to have passed only with (historically precedented) interpretation of convenience of the UN Charter Also, since Bush refused to commit any troops to the UN, or even to allow U.S. operations to be conducted under UN flag, or even to allow a U.S. General to pretend to be a UN commander, the war was launched as a coalition using the UN as a cover, rather than as a UN operation.
Nonetheless, great damage to the image and legitimacy of the UN was caused, even in the West, with greater effect in the Third World, more still in Arab and Muslim countries, especially in Iraq and its allies.
V. Historical Context of the Establishment of the UN.
War generally heightens concern about improving international relations. Bush's war in the Middle East is no exception, especially when Bush attempted to rationalize his war by describing it as an "opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations". [A critic might argue that Bush contrarily delivered a contraction--"the rule of the law of the jungle"--His army was stronger than Iraq's].
World War I was a catastrophe which led to the League of Nations--predecessor of the UN. It also changed the character of class conflict. It was an imperial war which culminated in class warfare. When the Tsarist Russian government was overthrown and replaced by an attempt to create a workers' state, a defeated imperial ally was converted into a class enemy which was immediately invaded by its former capitalist allies. Class warfare became more than domestic struggle with feeble attempts at international workers' solidarity. The capitalist military counterattack failed to destroy the USSR. The focus of class struggle shifted to Germany. The communist motto, "Workers of the World Unite"--"Proletarian Internationalism"--arguing that German workers were workers first and Germans incidentally--had especial appeal to Jewish workers after centuries of discrimination (the phrase "Communist Jew" became a cliche even in the U.S. anti-communist right). Regrouping, German and international capitalists built Nazism into a domestic and international military and ideological anti-Bolshevik force by reversing "Proletarian Internationalism". Patriotism (nationalism) was emphasized. The German identity of workers was emphasized. They were encouraged as good German patriots to unite in "class collaboration" with German capitalists--"National Socialism", which led naturally to aggravated racism. The establishment of concentration camps "for Germans" to eliminate communist and social democratic opposition capped the successful culmination of the domestic campaign, but the international campaign continued until Stalin appealed to Hitler's German chauvinism, which proved stronger than his anti-communism. International class warfare was interrupted and temporarily replaced by an alliance of convenience with more imperial than class character. The UN's structure emerged from that awkward alliance of World War II, which was the first war in which soldiers described as "United Nations" troops fought. The five victorious powers became permanent members of the Security Council [The same nations also still constitute the only officially-admitted nuclear weapon powers]. The resumption of class warfare with the anti-communist Cold War collided with the established UN structure--even though China was denied its place for many years, the USSR was a permanent member of the Security Council, where most of the UN's extremely limited power resides. It was necessary to invent the idea that absence (and later abstaining, an easier case to make) is equivalent to concurrence in the Security Council in an attempt to provide UN legitimization for Truman's "police action"--the Korean War.
The Security Council, where the bulk of the UN's limited power is concentrated still maintains its essential structure as a "World War II Victors' Club" of the five permanent members with "veto" power, despite the increase in the number of non-permanent members. The General Assembly, however, has changed dramatically with decolonialization. It is denigrated as a "debating society", but it has helped develop a global sense of conscience and propriety. However, its primary power, the power of the budget, has essentially been supplanted by the U.S./("north" or "west")-dominated Committee on Program and Coordination which now prepares the budget for rubber-stamping by the General Assembly [Pearson (1988)]. In its attempts to represent common interests, it has met with little success, witness the fate of the New International Economic Order, the New International Information and Communication Order, the multitudinous (non-binding) resolutions passed by overwhelming majorities which are blithely ignored, witness the fate of UNESCO.
VI. Law by Common Consent vs. "Might is Right".
Another way of expressing the distinction between "common interests" and "special interests" is to distinguish between law formulated by common consent and law imposed by force upon unwilling subjects. Law depends primarily upon voluntary compliance. {"It is not the existence of judicial or police sanctions which makes a system of law strong and respected, but...popular acceptance and support..."--English international lawyer Brierly [Fawcett (1968) 7]}. Victors' law (or lack thereof, allowing the strong to prey on the weak) over the vanquished can be imposed through force as long as an adequate imbalance in power exists, but it will ceaselessly be challenged by those who consider it unjust.
Traditional international law, which appears neutral or indifferent, is ipso facto permissive, and is derived from the liberal laisser-faire (anything goes) capitalist system, and sanctioned the seizure of the wealth and possessions of weaker peoples. It recognized and enforced a colonial and imperial right--a non-interventionist 'right of dominion' for the benefit of the 'civilized nations' which was institutionalized at the 1885 Berlin Conference on the Congo. Competition between the 'Christian kingdoms of Europe' to establish dominion and empire through unbridled sovereignty was regulated in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, which established the 'European system of States' balancing sovereignty and the plurality of Europe, as illustrated in the Peace of Utrecht (1713) [Bedjaoui (1979) 50].
The Eurocentric international law was extended to the New World, but "As part of Asia had grosso modo eluded direct European domination, unlike Latin America and Africa, the relations between Asia and Europe were systemized in a sort of minor and marginal form of international law." [Bedjaoui (1979) 51].
The U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1776 marked a transition from European to Christian international law extending it from Europe to include the US. Other states emerged and were recognized only if willed by the Concert of Europe and under conditions imposed by it.
Not until the UN Charter was adopted could an open community replace the closed one, and the expression 'peace-loving States' be substituted for 'civilized nations' in the wording of Article 4, paragraph I of the Charter.
As Mohammed Bedjaoui [Bedjaoui(1979) 49-51] put it,
"In addition to ratifying the European countries' right to conquer and occupy the territories concerned, international law recognized the validity of 'unequal treaties', essentially leonine, whereby the weaker peoples for a long time delivered up their natural wealth on terms imposed on them by the stronger States. Neutral or indifferent, international law was thus also a formalities law, attached to the semblance of equality which barely hid the flagrant inequalities of the relationships expressed in these leonine treaties."
"It was also a law eminently suited to the protection of the 'civilized countries'' privileges, through the interests of their nationals. By virtue of diplomatic protection and intervention, the law enabled the nationals of the countries concerned to obtain, in certain States, advantages which were not even awarded to the citizens of those States."
"International law made use of a series of justifications and excuses to create legitimacy for the subjugation and pillaging of the Third World, which was pronounced uncivilized."
"However, the consistency of the system required that the freedom of action allotted by international law to a 'civilized' State should be matched by the same freedom for any other civilized State. This accepted international law was thus obliged to assume the essential function of reconciling the freedom of every State belonging to the family of 'civilized= nations' with the freedom of all the other States in the same family."
"To keep in line with the predatory economic order, this international law was thus obliged simultaneously to assume the guise of:
(a) an oligarchic law governing relations between civilized States...;
(b) a plutocratic law allowing these states to exploit weaker peoples;
(c) a non-interventionist law (to the greatest possible extent), carefully drafted to allow a wide margin of laisser-faire and indulgence to the leading States in the club.
"...As it (international law) had been formed historically on the basis of regional acts of force, it could not be an international law established by common accord, but an international law given to the whole world by one or two dominant groups. This is how it was able to serve as a legal basis for the various political and economic aspects of imperialism."
"This classic international law thus consisted of a set of rules with a geographic basis (it was a European law), a religious-ethical inspiration (it was a Christian law), and economic motivation (it was a mercantilist law), and political aims (it was an imperialist law)."
The foundation of international law originated from the Council of Europe to regulate imperial relations between competing European rivals and between imperial powers and the countries within their empire or "sphere of influence". The International Court of Justice has the same origin and original mission. The WFSW proposed the establishment of a "law of common consent" World Court to supercede the colonial-origin International Court of Justice at the UN Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development.
VII. The U.S. Role and Influence in the UN.
Bush's proclaimed support for the United Nations and the "rule of law" in "a new world order" can be evaluated on a sincerity-hypocrisy scale using several indices:
The U.S. administration holds the world's record for negative, obstructive votes in the UN. Of the 83 resolutions passed overwhelmingly by split vote in the 43rd and 44th sessions of the General Assembly the U.S. administration concurred only 13 times. Only on human rights resolutions, [where the index of concurrence for the 44th General Assembly was minus 82%] is the U.S. administration more obstructive than in opposing the dozens of resolutions to enhance national security by enhancing international security, which it systematically and repeatedly opposes (44th GA concurrence: minus 54%) [Dittmann (1991)], often casting the sole negative vote. It cast the sole vote even against dialogue to improve the international situation (43/87) [See Figures 1, 2, 3 and Table 1]. Former U.S. representative to the UN, Richard Williamson, describes the obstructionism quite differently--as being "outvoted"$%^.
The UN is "broke" because of obstruction to attempts to "fix" it. The U.S. administration cast the only vote against a resolution to strengthen the UN into an effective international security system (45/80), which it has opposed every year it has been offered.
Corroborating evidence is provided by noting that the U.S. administration refuses the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was the only government to boycott the UN Conference on the Relation between Disarmament and Development. It and the United Kingdom do not participate in UNESCO.
Human rights covenants which have already entered into force as the law of the planet provide another index. Important covenants include those on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights; Civil and Political Rights; Against Racism; Against Apartheid; Against Genocide; and Against Discrimination Against Women. Of these, the U.S. has ratified only one (genocide); the NATO pact has a spotty record (14 ratifications are lacking); Kuwait has ratified only the covenants against racism and Apartheid; Saudi Arabia has approved only the covenant against genocide; Iraq, the USSR, and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) nations have ratified all of them. In addition the U.S. administration has discredited the UN Human Rights Commission by applying pressure to condemn Cuba, which is protecting itself from powerful CIA subversive forces, while relieving pressure on Guatemala, described as the worst violator of human rights in this century where the CIA overthrew the democratic government in 1954, imposing a repressive "death squad" regime which continues to rule.
While exploiting the UN as cover for military operations of the U.S. administration, insult is added to injury--the U.S is by far the biggest dead beat UN debtor: it does not pay its dues. As of 31 July 1992, the U.S. was $757.4 million in arrears [Los Angeles Times (1992) A8]. Tolerating such exploitation does little for the image of the UN.
Even though the U.S. government conducted most of the military operations against Iraq it has no intention of becoming "the world's policeman". It intends to intervene only when interests represented by the U.S. government are in jeopardy. Enforcement through the UN only when the U.S. government is concerned makes a mockery of the concept of the "rule of law".
Hypocritical exploitation of the UN as a front for the special interests represented by the U.S. Government can only serve to delegitimize the UN in the eyes of the common interest. The Chair of the Joint Armed Forces Committee, Les Aspin, was very candid about the exploitation of the UN by the U.S. government. For example, when he was asked if he supported the use of "preemptive strikes" to "take out nuclear capability" he responded affirmatively, but added,
"Now, you'd want to do it with international cooperation. You'd want to do it under some international organization, if you could. But basically, in the last analysis, the country that provides the force is going to be the United States....I would say we would like to have some international -- either an organization endorse the proposition like the United Nations, or some ad hoc coalition endorse it. But if you can't get it, that doesn't mean you shouldn't do it. I mean, the United Nations should be used whenever we can, whenever we're putting together the idea of the use of force to protect our own national security interest. But if you haven't got international cooperation, that doesn't mean you shouldn't do it..if it's the only way to get it, then we shouldn't be stopped because we can't get anybody else to agree with it." (Aspin, 1992).
Besides proliferation there is also concern that some other country than the U.S. might actually use nuclear weapons, in which case it is reported that former National Security Advisor Brzezinski "suggests that...the US (not the UN) should consider teaching a lesson to the world what will happen if nuclear weapons are used, i.e., go down and blast them off the face of the earth..." (Aspin, 1992).
VIII. Future Direction for the UN.
History is at a critical juncture for the UN. The awkward structure inherited from the temporary alliance with the USSR and aggravated by the revolution in China is gradually being overcome. Russia is playing a compliant role. China frequently abstains, at least for the time being. The class role of the UN is becoming more blatant in the Security Council. Simultaneously, the Iraq war exposed the discrepancy between military and economic power. Bush commanded the power of the only remaining military superpower, but he had not at his command comparable financial and economic power. Neither Germany nor Japan had much enthusiasm for the war, nor had they any role in initiating or prosecuting the war. However, they were expected to defray much of the U.S. military expenditure, which they did.
Imbalances between military, economic, and political power cause stress and unleash forces which tend to reestablish parity. The financial burden borne by the two economic "superpowers" led predictably, to (so far informal) proposals that the economic superpowers gain correspondingly greater political power in the United Nations. Japan's Prime Minister expressed the expectation that Japan would obtain a permanent seat by 1995, the 50th anniversary of the UN. Suggestions for reform have been restricted exclusively to expansion of the Security Council--particularly to the inclusion of Japan and Germany accompanied by a proposed minimum two-nation "veto" which would continue the practice of using the UN Security Council as a vehicle for world international class conflict [variously described as "First World"/"Third (or "Fourth") World", or "rich/poor", or "North" (or "West")/"South", or "industrialized" ("developed" or "overdeveloped") / "developing" (an apparently overly optimistic euphemism), or Security Council/General Assembly] with the industrialized "North", led by the U.S., in effective control of the Security Council. China, which still purports to represent the Third World in the global class struggle, would lose its veto power. Ruling the world using the UN will appear to be much more legitimate than exercising power unilaterally or through alliances like NATO or the Persian Gulf "coalition".
Iraq expected to inherit the role of the fallen Shah of Iran is acting as the surrogate "gendarme of the gulf" [Al-Bazaz, Saad, (1992)]. Whether it misinterpreted Bush's intentions, whether Bush deliberately misled it, or whether changed his mind is not certain, It has resulted in the unprecedented abuse of sovereignty by the UN which can encourage those who consider that the avidity with which governments defend their perogatives has made the concept of national sovereignty into a sacrosanct impediment to effective UN action. However, it is likely that it will establish a precedent for the violation of sovereignty only of Third World states which are not client staes, not of Security Council Permament Members or of their client states.
IX. Normative Legitimation of the UN.
Against the imperial forces seeking to use the UN as a class weapon in international class conflict stand the aspirations of the common interests seeking to achieve a new world order in which respected, legitimized, common consent law would prevail. The greater the perception of justice and legitimacy, the greater the degree to which law can depend upon voluntary compliance. The sense of justice, in large part, depends upon basic principles which have broad, if not universal agreement, to wit (non-exhaustive list restricted to principles relevant to international law):
1) Concurrence in the law, or, at least, significant, democratic participation in its formulation and/or respect for its formulators;
2) Uniform applicability (Violated by the NPT).
3) Universal enforcement (According to basic principles of law selective enforcement against Iraq for military occupation was a legal defense)
4) Due process and fair administration, best accomplished with some form of separation of legislative, administrative (enforcing, prosecuting), and judicial authority with "checks and balances";
[5) Other generally accepted principles, such as no ex post facto laws, or ad hominem laws, etc.]
6) For practical purposes, lofty principles (such as those above) must be sacrificed (at least temporarily) to current power distribution.
It is little recognized how much has already been accomplished in existing treaties, covenants, conventions, legal decisions of the ICJ and other judicial bodies, the UN Charter, the Nuremberg principles, the operation of UN and regional agencies, and even by habit and precedent.
If there is hope to achieve even a modicum of international law by common consent, structurally, a shift in power from the Security Council to the General Assembly, preferably by abolishing the Security Council, coupled with a "binding triad" voting system for the General Assembly, is required, but politically difficult. The current contradictions between military and economic power, exposed by the Iraq war, have lead to demands for UN Reform which open new opportunities
Appendix
Security Council Resolutions leading to the Iraq war:
Resolution 660 (2 August 1990); Unanimous demand for "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from occupying positions."
Resolution 661 (6 August 1990); "Encouragement" (with two abstentions--Yemen and Cuba) for a commercial, financial, and military boycott of Iraq, excepting "strictly medical" supplies and food when "justified by humanitarians considerations".
Resolution 662 (9 August 1990); Annexation of Kuwait unanimously declared null and void.
Resolution 664 (18 August 1990); Unanimous demand that Iraq "authorize and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq of nationals from third countries."
Resolution 665 (25 August 1990); Demands that UN member states cooperate with the Kuwait government and "deploy naval forces" in the region to "take measures" which are in accord with the circumstances of the moment according to which it will be necessary "under the authority of the Security Council" to stop all merchant vessels which arrive or depart in order to inspect their cargo and to confirm their destination and to strictly apply dispositions of Resolution 661 relative to maritime transport.
RESOLUTION 678 1. DEMANDS that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;
2. AUTHORIZES Member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;
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