Before the capitalist victory in the cold class war, the former USSR observed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing during a year and a half commencing on Hiroshima Day, 6 August 1985. In the same period the U.S. government conducted 24 nuclear weapons tests. Not all of the tests were officially announced, and there is a suspicion that had the USSR not detected them, the U.S. government would have advanced once again a traditional excuse of unverifiability for refusing to sign a CTB Treaty. [Carter reportedly was an exception to this tradition and sought a CTB Treaty, only to be advised by the weapons labs that the limited "shelf life" of weapons made testing necessary to assure reliability.] With the dissolution of the USSR, which was the primary nuclear target, it was anticipated that it would be politically unfeasible to justify further nuclear testing. However, not only the U.S., but China continue testing.

The traditional motivation of "nuclear economic warfare" is still operative, but the recent excuses for the continuation of nuclear testing have shifted to military significance. Since the collapse of the USSR there has reigned some confusion about the intended adversary and tarrget. It has recently been argued that protection of "vital U.S. interests" require continued massive military exxpenditures with a nuclear component and with continued nuclear testing.

Different weapons are suitable for different targets. With the USSR, nuclear strategy was multiple-tiered--unfulfilled aspirations for strategic "first strike" and "counterforce" capability, strategic deterrence ("second strike" or "countervalue") capability, theater nuclear capability, and tactical nuclear capability, all tied together with concepts of "escalation dominance" and "graduated response". For the foreseeable future, the remnants of the USSR seem unlikely targets. Attention has shifted to Third World challenges. Libya, North Korea, Iraq have been mentioned. These examples of potential horizontal proliferation have incited concern for further horizontal proliferation and for the future of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty of 1970 (NPT), due to be considered for extension in 1995.

All sovereign nations are equal, but some are more equal than others.

The quid pro quo for nations to accept secondary status as non-nuclear states was both assistance in developing "Atoms for Peace"--nuclear power plants, and good faith negotiations by the "first class sovereignty" nuclear powers to engage in good faith negotiations to secure an early end to the nuclear arms race, particularly including a cessation of nuclear testing. The Third Review Conference on the NPT, held in Geneva 27 August-21 September 1985, emphasized the importance of the CTB to the NPT. Since the U.S. government, in particular, is widely considered to be in violation of the NPT, both by its intransigance in nuclear weapons control and disarmament negotiations, and in continued nuclear testing, bargaining to extend the NPT can be expected to be tough and embarrassing.

Other Expressed Motivations.

Reliability.

Broad (1986 p.111) reports that in 1978 Carter requested the design of "wooden" weapons which would not require reliability testing and which then would not be an impediment to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Woodruff testified before Congress that reliability testing is not required (Evernden, J., 1986). As late as 8 May 1985, the director of Los Alamos, Donald M. Kerr, still maintained, in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control, National Security, and Science that:

"A CTB would lead to a loss in confidence in the reliability of our nuclear weapons ..." (Stein, 1986,p.8)

According to Gerald Marsh and Hugh De Witt, "Once a weapon is certified for stockpile, reliability can be insured indefinitely with a program of inspection, non-nuclear testing, and periodic warhead remanufacture". (Stein, J., 1986, p. 9).

The validity of the claim that reliability requires testing is more readily evaluated when it is noted that approximately 70% of the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. government and of the USSR consist of warheads with yields over 150 kT which cannot be tested currently without violating the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Besides the technical questions, a multitude of other questions are suggested by the U.S. government's contention that reliability requires nuclear testing.

1. Has readiness been a motivation for testing? Glenn Seaborg (1986), former head of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated, "Proof tests were just off-the-shelf tests (which) could have been done for appearances." Reliability testing was not added to design criteria until 1980 (Cochran, T., 1986).

2. Even if readiness had been a motivation for testing, technically could it or did it contribute significantly to assuring readiness? In four out of six cases where weapons did not perform according to expected yield (they did explode however!), they had been deployed without tests during the 1958-61 moratorium. In one case the problems were rectified without nuclear testing. In two others the problems were due to non-nuclear components. In the last case nuclear tests were not useful in remedy (Rosengren, J. 1983).

3. Even if testing could help assure readiness, is there any significant asymmetry between US/USSR nuclear weapons which would suggest that the effects of testing or of the cessation of testing are not equal in their advantages or disadvantages? (Just as is currently the case with weapons with a yield greater than 150kT, both the U.S. and the USSR are free to choose between reliable "wooden" weapons and highly sophisticated weapons which may optimize some performance criterion with some sacrifice of reliability.)

4. For purposes of strategic stability, is it not desirable to have less reliability -- exactly the kind of uncertainty in the success of a first strike which the U.S. administration claims is the most recent and limited mission for Star Wars? First strike capability requires unachievably high reliability, while even a ragged retaliatory second strike would cause catastrophic destruction. Questionable reliability helps maintain deterrence against first strike.

Verification.

"Seismologists have met all the technical problems of verifying a comprehensive test ban. Now it is clear that political considerations have stood in the way of such a treaty all along, and verification problems have been used as an excuse."-Jack Evernden, U.S. government

seismologist (1985, p. 9)

Contemporary seismological technology is capable of distinguishing the "signatures" of explosions and earthquakes down to about 1kT. Even the lingering hope that fear of "decoupled" or muffled explosions could be used to avoid a test ban have been disposed of by refinement of seismological techniques (Evernden, J. 1985). Nevertheless, the U.S. administration is still reluctant to accept the feasibility of verification technology. In a bold and dramatic move, the National Resources Defense Committee and the USSR agreed to establish recriprocal seismic stations to monitor explosions. However, the U.S. government's resistance to verification is still not completely overcome. Visas for the USSR seismologists to set up monitoring sites in the U.S. were denied. Nonetheless, verification excuses for refusing to sign a CTB Treaty have become feebler and less vocal.

Military Significance.

As earlier anticipated in the original published forrm of this paper, and as argued more recently by the Pentagon, the argument of last resort that a CBT would impair the military capability of the U.S. government and of its allies seems to be the actual reason for opposition to a CBT Treaty, rather than the verification and reliability arguments that had been earlier advanced. Since it is the U.S. government which refuses to countenance a CTB, U.S. analyses tend to focus on the effect of a CTB on the military capability of the U.S. government. That is the focus here as well. Of course a CTB would be not only a limitation on the U.S. government, its example could be expected to be so politically compelling that all nations would find it difficult to avoid following suit. Despite this focus it is understood that any weapons which could be developed by the U.S. government through nuclear testing could also be developed to a degree, and over an extended period of time, by other nuclear nations.

Military Applications of Nuclear Testing.

Nuclear weapons essentially produce big or bigger radioactive explosions (with no upper limit in size, only in utility). There are some variations in the nature of nuclear weapons which can be developed with nuclear testing.

If one considers, as Taylor (1986) does, a morpho-logical outline of conceivable types of nuclear weapons by:

a) energy source [fission, boosted fission, fission-fusion-fission, fusion, (as yet unachieved pure fusion)],

b) energy enhancement (yield maximation, kinetic, EM, neutron, beta, fission and fusion products, secondary radioactivity, blast and magnetohydrodynamic shock)),

c) energy suppression (of all of b) except yield),

d) anisotropy (directionality)

the result is a 5 x 9 x 8 x 2 = 720 element matrix of possible variations. To this should be added miniaturiza-tion, yield to mass ratio (both important for 1st-strike capability), hardening (either to survive attack or, alternatively, "salvaging" warheads with "burglar alarms" which will prematurely detonate (over adversary territory) if attacked by, for example, an ABM system). This is without considering energy spectra and yield (infinite variations), or combinations (again an infinite number of possible variations). To this list some important but neglected subcategories should be mentioned: EMP (electromagnetic pulse), thermal vs. high energy neutrons, low yield weapons below 1kT (which cross the threshold separating nuclear and chemical explosion yields).

These variations can be used with different combinations of deployment, delivery systems, target types and locations, and intended damage.

Taylor (1986, p.14) claims that "by searching (the possible combinations), at random or systematically, for examples which are similar enough not to require nuclear tests of each of them to certify their performance," he has discovered (no such examples), even though he strongly suspects that "all but a small fraction...are technically impractical...or of no evident potential military use." Nonetheless, "random selection of subcategories...has tended to yield concepts that look interesting but are both unfamiliar and difficult to assess. Most of them cannot be discarded as impractical for the foreseeable future." He cites anisotropic high altitude bursts with enhanced EM radiation through an atmospheric window in the EM spectrum as an example. Weapons laboratory excitement at the prospects of "sweet technology" is compared to the atmosphere of the 1950s (when I did my MS thesis on nuclear weapons at a U.S. Army testing lab). He foresees not only "third generation", but "endless generations" of nuclear weapons.

Let us consider some of the most prominent of these new areas of development.

1. Shaped (anisotropic) Nuclear Charges. These are first-strike weapons par excellence designed to destroy bunkers and C3I (Control, Communication, Command, and Intelligence) systems in a "decapitating" strike in an attempt to cripple a retaliatory second strike. Forward-deployed strategic missiles, like the Pershing IIs, which are designed to penetrate deep underground, would reduce warning time to just a few minutes. Destruction of deep bunkers as part of "protracted nuclear war" strategies is also a possible mission for shaped charges.

2. High EMP Explosions. Detonations with high rise times (of the order of 5 ns (5x10-9 seconds)) which can produce high EMP frequencies with deep penetration capability, thereby providing increased kill capability against targets which have been hardened against EMP are being developed. With high frequencies the EMP can penetrate even tiny cracks in satellites, missiles, aircraft, electronics and communications equipment.

3. Hardening. A massive EMP simulation facility at Kirtland Air Force Base has been built and an empire of EMP researchers has been established to harden military equipment, satellites, aircraft, communications, sensors, etc. Even the Federal Communications Commission and public utilities are involved in the process of hardening the infrastructure of the U.S. economy against the consequences of nuclear detonations. Since a major nuclear exchange would make such preparations irrelevant, the presumed purpose for this activity is preparation for protracted, limited (if possible) nuclear war. Since the magnitude of the EMP was unanticipated, previous experience overloaded measuring equipment. Thus there is uncertainty about the spectrum and magnitude of EMP, which is different for different types of weapons, and which depends upon the characteristics of the atmosphere. This uncertainty will persist in the absence of atmospheric testing.

4. Special effects. Yield is not the only variable in a nuclear explosion. There are possible design variations which which can vary the mix of blast, electromagnetic radiation, radioisotopes, beta and alpha rays, and fission fragments. The neutron (or "enhanced radiation") bomb is a modern variation of the "dirty" bomb with a Cobalt mantle from the 1950s. Militarily the difference will not be great. All nuclear bombs produce a great deal of radiation. Edward Teller's 1959 dream of a "pure radiation" bomb, a small tactical fusion warhead without a dirty fission bomb trigger, remains unrealized almost three decades later. Two decades were required to produce the next approximation, the "enhanced radiation warhead." Despite jocular statements that refer to the neutron bomb as "the ideal capitalist weapon--one that kills people but preserves property", at 1kt (i.e., one thousand tons of TNT equivalent--the explosive power of one thousand World War II "blockbusters") the blast damage will still be enormous, as will thermal destruction and radioactive contamination.

(Bomb blast is only reduced to 40% of released energy in a 1kT neutron bomb compared to 50% in 10kT fission bomb; fallout is reduced from 10% to 5%; thermal radiation from 35% to 25%; prompt radiation is enhanced from 5% to 30%, the main and desired effect.)

Improvements in tank armour (against which the neutron bomb was supposed to be effective) have led Harris and Gsponer (1986) to conclude, "the weapon itself has no military value."

5. Excalibur (nuclear explosion-pumped x-ray laser) and Star Wars. Excalibur was the centerpiece and probably the original motivation for the Star Wars program. It has been estimated that some 10-20 nuclear tests would be required merely to determine feasibility, with perhaps 100-200 more for development (Stein, J., 1968 p.8). Developed into a deployable weapon, it was portrayed as capable of providing multi-directional x-ray laser beam pulses pumped by a nuclear explosion Selden, R., 1986). Because nuclear weapons are banned from space by treaty, the only overtly proposed military use for such a system was as a "pop up" weapon to be launched from a submarine as an ABM (anti-ballistic missile) weapon. (Since the launching submarines would be several thousand kilometers removed from USSR land-based launch sites, getting a sight on them during boost phase after launch detection is possible only if the earth is flat.) Despite public reports to the contrary, leaks from the weapons labs indicated that the testing has not been promising, and it has finally been abandoned.

6. ABM terminal defenses and ASATs. Nuclear weapons are considered to be too blunt and intrusive to be effective either as terminal defense weapons or as ASATs. The U.S. government's nuclear ASAT was abandoned when it was discovered that the resulting EMP would knock out U.S. satellites as well. (The U.S. military, with far flung forces, is most dependent upon satellites.) High accuracy and technological developments have shifted emphasis to (non-nuclear) lasers, particle beams, and ultra accurate high impact technology (HIT), such as "rail guns."

7. Miniaturization. The "backpack" nuclear weapon is already available. Smaller, lighter warheads can be used to increase the numbers of multiple warheads a missile launcher can transport if SALT II limitations are violated. This would increase countersilo kill capability an insignificant amount because the sum of the kill probabilities Pk of warheads in the U.S. arsenal already far exceeds the number of land-based USSR missiles. [äPk for Minuteman missiles alone is 1725. (This means that if there were 2100 to be attacked without multiple targetting, 1725 of them would be expected to be destroyed with 300 psi hardening) The USSR has 1458 land-based strategic missiles, which comprise 3/4 of its strategic warhead arsenal]. (With greater accuracy and multiple targetting, the number of land-based missiles which would survive a first strike can be whittled down, but this is a long way from first strike capability in any rational sense. The missiles may have multiple warheads, and there remains the bulk of the essentially invulnerable submarine-launched missiles which could destroy the U.S. as a civilization several times over. Considering the miniaturization already achieved, additional miniaturization would make little difference, even in counterforce missions other than first strike.

8. Primary Enhancement. "Dial a yield" bombs, which allow essentially the same bomb design to have varying yield. This is accomplished by controlling the initial externally-produced neutron flux which accelerates the fission chain reaction by increasing the number of initiating fissions, and by changing the amount of booster fusioning LiD in the center of the fission bomb. Both of these factors control the electromagnetic pressure on the main LiD fusion charge from the fission bomb. This could be useful if a military commander is ever encountered who would like to reduce his firepower.

Nuclear Economic Warfare.

In his book, On Thermonuclear War, Herman Kahn coined the phrase, "thinking about the unthinkable." The "unthinkable" was supposed to be nuclear war, but no significant difficulty in planning for nuclear war is detectable in the nuclear weapons establishment. However, the strategy of utilizing the greater strength of the U.S. economy, coupled with technological superiority, parlayed into nuclear escalation which would force the USSR either to accept (nuclear) military superiority by the U.S. government or bankrupt the USSR economy in trying to achieve parity, has been with us since the end of World War II. This strategy did ultimately succeed in achieving both goals--at the cost of a couple of trillion dollars. General Groves, head of the Manhattan project, opined that the development of nuclear weapons by the USSR would require "20 years, if ever." The possibility that the USSR could achieve, if not "guns and butter", at least "missiles and margarine" did turn out to be "unthinkable". The same argument was also made with respect to Star Wars and against a CTB, most recently by the Secretary for military affairs, Casper Weinberger in a summary of his testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee (12 January 1987).

Actually, as noted by analysts in the USSR (Andreas, D. 1987), with the huge trade and budget deficits, weakening dollar, and declining competitiveness, the U.S. cannot long sustain its escalating armaments, which have been purchased with plastic (on credit).

No new nuclear weapons systems on the horizon, least of all Star Wars, appear to be cost effective at the margin. Either they fail to make any significant change in the current condition, or they can be countered with much less cost and effort.

Except for the threat of nuclear war, both the U.S. and the USSR are militarily secure. Gorbachev was sound in his assessment that maintenance of military security requires the transfer of resources from contemporary mobilizations to technology both for economic development and for the prevention of surprise military technological breakthroughs which cannot be readily countered. (Progress toward building international institutions capable of providing security is agonizingly slow. For the forseeable future, ambitions to "roll back" socialism having been realized, future military means can be expected to be directed at neo-imperial competition for dominance over the resources, labor supply, investment opportunities, and markets in the Third World.

Mission Assessment.

Star Wars has been described as a weapons system in search of a mission. Weapons without missions are pointless as well as dangerous and expensive. Let us survey possible missions for new nuclear weapons. There is overlap between mission categories. The list is not exhaustive. The number of possible mission scenarios capable of being invented by nuclear game theorists is essentially unlimited. The major identifiable proposed missions is examined.

1. Defense.

a) Against strategic attack (first strike).

In contrast to the USSR, the U.S. still has its strategic geographical advantages. With weak and friendly neighbors North and South, and oceans East and West, the U.S. is still militarily invulnerable, except for nuclear weapons, against which it is and will remain essentially defenseless (except for deterrence). The obvious way to remove this threat to national security would be to agree to nuclear disarmament. A CTB would at least largely prevent the aggravation of increasing nuclear insecurity, especially if it were accompanied by continued observance of the ABM Treaty, no further violation of the numerical limits of the SALT II Treaty, nor of its prohibition of new strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems. In other words, the "positive feedback insecurity cycle", in which the U.S. government tries to compensate for a perceived loss of nuclear superiority by further escalation--escalation which is inevitably followed by a response by the USSR, as has happened repeatedly in the past, with increased risk of nuclear war and decreasing security as a consequence, could be broken by the implementation of what would essentially be a freeze, with a CTB Treaty as a primary component. Reciprocation of the unilaterally-declared "no first use" policy by the USSR would also be an ameliorating factor, as would detente in general.

The U.S. government's repeated nuclear tests during the moratorium have been conducted in a manner seemily designed to blast a CTB off the agenda as expeditiously as possible in order to avoid continuing political embarrassment. Announcements of U.S. government tests generally occur immediately after the USSR announces the initiation or an extension of unilateral moratoria (including the moratorium on ASAT testing). The attitude seems to be "now that the U.S. government has violated the moratorium, let's forget about it and get on with nuclear escalation in the hope of achieving nuclear military superiority." However, continued observance and repeated extensions of the unilateral moratorium by the USSR resurrect the spectre to haunt them.

Although much is made of the economic burden and of the scientific and technical difficulties of providing a defense against strategic nuclear attack, the logical defect is the most compelling. In a first strike a large fraction of the USSR nuclear arsenal would be destroyed, so providing an aggressive "defense" against the far fewer surviving weapons in a retaliatory second strike is easier than providing an actual defense against the original arsenal.

Even if the U.S. government honestly desired to achieve a genuine defense through continued nuclear testing, logic alone compels that the effort would increase aggressive first strike capability at the expense of deterrence, upon which "defense", such as it is, depends in the nuclear age.

b) Against theater or tactical attack ("first use").

The policies as well as the actions of the U.S. government and of the USSR stand in sharp contrast. The USSR has an announced policy of "no first use." The U.S. government has repeatedly stated that it might resort to the use of nuclear weapons if it faced a military defeat in the field. The U.S. government has been making explicit threats to use nuclear weapons, in the majority of cases against non-nuclear states, about once every two years, on the average (Ege, K. and Makhijani, A., 1982; Blechman, B and Kaplan, S. 1978; Ellsberg, D., 1981). The USSR has hinted at dire, perhaps nuclear, consequences twice on record--during the Berlin Crisis and during the invasion of Egypt.

The main deterrent to "first use," as contrasted with "first strike", has been fear of the political repercussions, although apprehension about a response-in-kind, or even an escalated response, can also have a deterrent effect. (After a massive retaliatory response to a first strike, the political consequences would pale to insignificance compared to the destruction).

c) Against strategic "flexible or graduated response" (no first strike).

As Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified in 1974, the USSR has proclaimed that it will not participate in "limited, protracted nuclear war" if it is attacked directly as part of a "flexible response" strategy. In this policy, as outlined in National Security Decision Memo #242 in 1973, updated with an expanded counterforce target list by Carter in P.D. 59, and, most recently in Reagan's Defense Guidance Plan, escalating targetting priorities are: First) industry "removed from population centers" (as if industry could ever be far from its workers); Second) the C3I system; Third) the non-nuclear military; and Finally) the nuclear retaliatory capability of the USSR (which would have been long since launched according to declared USSR policy)(Johnston. O. 1980 p.1).*

In order to restore faith in the "nuclear umbrella" for NATO, which Kissinger declared no longer credible, the U.S. government established forward-deployed strategic weapons under U.S. government control on the soil of Nato countries. These were designed as guarantors of automatic escalation from the theater level to the strategic nuclear level of warfare. The USSR responded as desired by declaring that it would launch a massive retaliatory attack against the U.S. if it were attacked by these weapons under U.S. government control. In this sense the same strategic USSR arsenal which provides nuclear deterrence against first strike also provides deterrence against limited strategic attack to the degree that the policy is deemed credible.

2. First Strike (strategic).

As mentioned above, Star Wars would logically be compelled to achieve first strike capability before it could constitute a defense. However, even first strike capability is not scientifically, technically, or economically achievable unless the sacrifice of perhaps something of the order of 100 million U.S. victims in the process is countenanced. It is sobering to recognize that close advisors to Reagan, like Colin Gray, among others, use figures of such magnitudes in their nuclear war gaming. "...a U.S. president cannot credibly threaten and should not launch a strategic nuclear strike if expected U.S. casualties are likely to involve 100 million or more American citizens." (Gray, C., and Payne, K., 1980, p. 26).

Actually, in Star Wars proposals, there is no serious suggestion that "terminal defenses" would be provided for people in cities, as would be required for both a real defense and for first strike (in order to reduce the consequences of the retaliatory second strike to tolerable proportions). "Point defenses" are proposed only for missiles in silos and for generals and politicians in bunkers. Excalibur, the nuclear-explosion-pumped x-ray laser weapon, the centerpiece of Star Wars, and of current nuclear testing, is being developed as part of the defense of the vulnerable first strike MX missiles. (See Below Decapitating Strike).

3. First Use (tactical first strike).

The primary deterrent against "first use" has been fear of the political repercussions. Now it is known that this was the case with Nixon's self-proclaimed "Madman Tactic" in which he purposely portrayed himself as so fanatically anti-communist that he would prefer to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in Viet Nam rather than to allow his forces to be defeated militarily (Haldeman, H., 1978. pp.81-85, 97-98). The same political deterrence which prevented Nixon from using nuclear weapons is operative, and perhaps even stronger, today.

The enormously greater explosive power (yield) of nuclear weapons compared to chemical explosives constituted the original primary component of the "nuclear threshold." Nuclear weapons are still qualitatively different in that they produce radiation and radioactivity, as well as a nuclear rather than an atomic mechanism (despite the misnomer "atomic" bomb), but in terms of destructive power and yield, the nuclear threshold has been eroded as the destructive power of non-nuclear (but quite unconventional) weapons (like cluster bombs) has increased and the yield of some nuclear warheads (like the neutron bomb) has been reduced to as low as 1kT. When the nuclear threshold has been thus overlapped, the argument that the nuclear/non-nuclear distinction is no longer significant can be used to overcome the psychological resistance to nuclear weapons and to reduce the political deterrence to their use.

Continued testing and development of lower yield nuclear weapons which reduce the nuclear threshold lends itself to arguments that there is nothing significantly different about nuclear weapons. This tends to undermine the psychological, political deterrence to the initiation of nuclear war.

4. Deterrence (nuclear second strike).

Even a minor nuclear power which has the capability of delivering one, a couple, or a few nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack possesses impressive and compelling nuclear deterrence. Few can conceive of foreign policy goals worthy of the sacrifice of a few, or even one major city. Reagan claims to have "explained" to Gorbachev that Star Wars "would protect against...the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles" (Smith, J., 1987 p.23), neglecting to consider that a minor nuclear power would not likely select intercontinental ballistic missiles as its choice of a delivery system. With respect to the major nuclear powers the case that nuclear deterrence is technologically unchallengable is even stronger.

Nuclear testing of Excalibur for Star Wars will not be any more effective in undermining nuclear deterrence than Star Wars itself. Nor will any of the other anticipated new nuclear weapons being developed with continued nuclear testing erode nuclear deterrence to any significant degree

5. Extended Deterrence (intimidation).

There is an old saw that everyone wants peace. Even Hitler wanted peace--a piece of Poland, a piece of...Now it is a "piece of the action." There are two dichotomous philosophical approaches to the universally desired peace: "Peace through Justice and International Law and Order" and "Peace through (military) Strength."

The "Peace through Strength" school argues that if the U.S. government possesses intimidating (particularly nuclear) power to deliver death and destruction, and if such power is accompanied by fanatic resolve to prevail in the game of "nuclear chicken" regardless of the consequences ("Better dead than red"), then adversaries will yield, the interests represented by the U.S. government can have their way, and there will be peace as a consequence.

International institutions are slowly being built, but the world is still essentially in a state of international anarchy. Even so, nuclear weapons are so politically objectionable that former Secretary of Defense McNamara has declared, with a bit of hyperbole, that they "have no military use whatsoever, except only to deter one's opponent form their use," (McNamara, R., ) in other words, they merely obviate their own existence (except for the risk and the expense)

6. Second Use.

Despite the current unilateral nature of the test moratorium, essential, if not precise parity in the long run will be restored and any nuclear weapons which the U.S. government might produce which might result in a "first use" advantage will be subject to a retaliatory response-in-kind. Tactical and theater nuclear deterrence through "second use" thus can be expected to be maintained.

7. Decapitating ("surgical") Strike.

One of the scenarios that has been imagined in order to justify Star Wars and its related nuclear testing program is that of a surgical decapitating strike against the highly accurate land-based and potentially vulnerable MX missiles and against the C3I system, leaving cities, industry, and second strike capability largely intact. The situation would then resemble the circumstance of Mutual Assured Destruction and conventional deterrence. After the highly accurate counterforce and first strike weapons are destroyed, the population and industry are still mutually held hostage against attack.

The strategy to defend this vulnerable counterforce capability and protracted nuclear war fighting capability has been referred to in Star Wars proposals as "Defended First Strike", but could better be called "Defended Window of Vulnerability," "Defended Counterforce," and/or "Defended Protracted Nuclear War Fighting Capability." The submarine-based Titan II missile (and upgraded Titan I) is a formidable first strike and counterforce weapon with high accuracy without the vulnerability problems of the MX, which tend to invite a preemptive first strike. Counterforce weapons which enhance first strike capability are destabilizing, corrosive of deterrence, increase the risk of nuclear war, and induce further build up of retaliatory forces to restabilize deterrence, or worse, encourage a response-in-kind which tends to create that most unstable and dangerous of conditions--mutual first strike. But first strike weapons which are vulnerable to first strike aggravate the instability and the risk.

First strike and protracted nuclear war fighting capability both increase the risk of nuclear war. It is missile testing to increase accuracy which most exacerbates the instability of first strike capability. However, shaped nuclear charges are specifically designed for a decapitating strike; EMP testing and hardening are intended primarily to enhance protracted nuclear war fighting capability; and Excalibur is intended to reduce the retaliatory second strike to tolerable proportions in order to achieve first strike capability.

The contradiction is that hardening C3I systems not only diminishes prospects for a decapitating strike, which is stabilizing, but enhances nuclear war fighting capabilty, which is destabilizing. However, it is much easier to maintain deterrence capability than nuclear war fighting capability.

With more than half of the U.S. government's warheads on submarines, the condition of "deterrence with overkill" will be maintained even with the MX deployed in a vulnerable mode. Further testing will enhance decapitating and nuclear fighting capability, both of which are destabilizing.

Conclusion.

Since nuclear weapons themselves have diminished military utility, a fortiori nuclear testing for variations on the way they produce radioactive explosions has even less military significance. None of the proposed new nuclear weapons has any prospect of modifying the nuclear stalemate to achieve nuclear superiority. None of them are cost effective at the margin. Additional nuclear testing will not provide McNamara with reason to change his assessment that current nuclear policy is a "cross between a bluff and a suicide pact." Insecurity in the nuclear age can be alleviated through detente, disarmament, justice, and international law and order, not with nuclear weapons testing.

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Stein, Josephine Anne, "Nuclear tests mean new weapons", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1986) pp. 8-11.

Taylor, Theodore B., "Endless generations of nuclear weapons," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 42 (9)(November 1986) pp. 12-15.

Thompson, E. P., and Smith, Dan (eds), Protest and Survive, Monthly Review Press, New York (1981).

21January1987 bin/word/CBT27-1.doc (yale)

/weapons/ (la palma)

*

*William Arkin, in his book, SIOP, cites essentially the reverse order of targetting priorities.

"...a U.S. president cannot credibly threaten and should not launch a strategic nuclear strike if expected U.S. casualties are likely to involve 100 million or more American citizens." (Gray, C., and Payne, K., 1980, p. 26).

2Á

third-generation

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