The oft-repeated story of Harry Truman's request for a one-handed economist (so she couldn't say, "...but on the other hand") is experiencing a revival. The INF is not an unalloyed blessing. There are some reasons for moderating optimism.

The psychological and ideological significance of Reagan negotiating and signing a treaty with the "evil empire" is difficult to overestimate. It had been contended that reliance on such a treaty would lower defenses, that the USSR would cheat on the treaty anyway, and that this would threaten national security. Recall how Nixon, who portrayed himself as such a fanatic anticommunist that he would rather resort to nuclear war than countenance a victory by the Vietnamese in Viet Nam, played the "China card." Cartoons have later portrayed Reagan toasting Deng as "my kind of Marxist-Leninist." The menacing "Communist Red China" became the People's Republic of China, a trade partner and erstwhile ally against the USSR. Similarly it will be difficult to sustain the "evil empire" ideology after Reagan, who made the term famous, negotiates and signs another treaty with the USSR. On the other hand, the "supping with the devil with a long spoon" vilification argument is still available.

On the one hand, Reagan's bluff in arms control posturing has been called. His "zero option" was designed to be a non-starter which would disarm world and domestic opinion by presenting an appearance of superficial reasonableness, but which would carry no risk of actual arms control. At the time, Reagan was proposing that he would not further escalate by forward-deploying strategic missiles in Europe if the USSR would engage in unilateral disarmament of theater weapons. It is argued that the deployment of the Euromissiles induced the USSR to accept the zero option. The events have the necessary chronology for causality, but lack sufficiency. In the interim the U.S. government and its NATO Pact allies paid a political price (not to mention the financial cost) which induced the development of a vigorous peace movement in Europe which still inspires fears of a non-nuclear Europe in the minds of nuclear war planners. Eugene Rostow, Reagan's "fox who formerly guarded the chickens" as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency bemoaned the INF "trap." As the Moonies Washington Times headlined it, "Soviet Arms Concessions Paint U.S. into a Corner." Indeed, the traditional verification excuses were stripped away as the USSR suggested verification rigor beyond what the U.S. government was willing to accept. "Linking" with other weapons systems failed as well as the "zero option" became "double zero," and the USSR indicated a willingness to trump any suggestions of further linkage to strategic nuclear weapons or to non-nuclear forces as long as the ABM Treaty were not violated, and as long as U.S. government violations of SALT II did not become too severe. There would be still a greater political price to pay were these popular treaties to be abandoned. This explains why the administration keeps trying so desperately to make the case that the U.S. would be "joining" the USSR in violating the treaties.

Psychologically, it is an encouraging success for the peace movement, but, on the other hand, it may reduce concern by eliminating the most visible and politically objectionable land-based systems while they are replaced by less visible undersea systems. The Greenham commons movement, for example, will need to mobilize around a new initiative. Like SALT II, the INF treaty does not halt the qualitative arms race. Breakouts of both the ABM treaty and SALT II are threatening.

Historically it is significant that this is the first treaty which would require some actual disarmament, instead of merely establishing quantitative arms control limits beyond anything intended in the next round of escalation. (Had the U.S. ratified SALT II, the USSR would have been unilaterally required to dismantle almost 250 launchers. Both SALT I and SALT II have required crunching many obsolete weapons in order to make room for modern ones within the quantitative limits.) On the other hand, it affects only about 4% of the nuclear arsenals.

On the one hand, these include the most destabilizing first strike weapons par excellence, the Pershing IIs, designed for "decapitating (and emasculating) surgical "strikes against C3I (control, communications, command, and intelligence) systems in underground bunkers with penetrating warheads and (third generation) shaped charges, for which the NATO Pact governments paid a heavy political price to deploy. They are dangerous forward-deployed strategic weapons (which the U.S. government refused to include within SALT II limits as strategic weapons) with short warning times. They tend to induce a L.O.W. ("launch on warning") automated defensive response, taking human beings "out of the (decision-making) loop", and increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war through computer error. On the other hand, the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization have to dismantle almost four times as many warheads as the U.S. and the NATO Pact. The Warsaw Treaty Organization will have no land-based theater nuclear weapons, while NATO Pact will keep its UK and French forces. (The French forces, like the Warsaw Pact forces, are not under unified military command).

On the one hand, this takes a rung out of the ladder of "escalation dominance" designed to guarantee escalation from theater nuclear war to strategic nuclear war. Remember, the Pershing IIs and the GLCMs (ground-launched cruise missiles) were deliberately placed on land in Europe instead of on ships and submarines off the coast in an attempt to restore credibility to the "nuclear umbrella." [The excuse that it was a response to the replacement of aging SS-4s and -5s was invented later. The SS-4s, -5s were inaccurate, single warhead, fixed, liquid-fueled missiles that invited attack. SS-20s are mobile, solid-fueled. They have higher accuracy and three warheads (whose total yield is less than the previous single warheads)]. Kissinger declared it not credible that the U.S. government would "sacrifice Boston to retaliate for Hamburg." The strategy worked. The USSR accommodated by declaring that it would retaliate against the U.S. mainland if a strategic nuclear attack were launched from Europe with missiles under U.S. government control. On the other hand, the next lower rung in automatic escalation, the tactical nuclear weapons which are forward-deployed in "launch 'em or lose 'em" modes designed to guarantee escalation across the nuclear threshold, from non-nuclear to nuclear conflict, remain, and their targets can be assigned to other weapons systems (albeit with a bit less first strike capability and without the short warning time). There are plans to increase other strategic nuclear forces in the European theater (more D5 warheads on Trident IIs) to compensate for the dismantled INF. The U.S. military will certainly request an increase in non-nuclear forces in Europe as well to overcome what it claims to perceive as a military disadvantage.

On the one hand, the USSR advocates reductions rather than increases in non-nuclear forces, especially destabilizing, offensive forces, to achieve balance. On the other hand, after almost a decade and a half of negotiations on MBFR (mutual balanced force reduction) in Vienna, not even agreement on the size of current forces has been achieved.

On the one hand, given the shape of the U.S. economy, enthusiasm for militarism will undoubtedly wane. On the other hand, previous indications that capitalism could not compete with the "Soviet threat," that workers anywhere who could do better without bosses was a threat to capitalists everywhere, especially in the poor, disdeveloping parts of the capitalist world ("Third World," or even "Fourth World"), has led to military efforts to counter the economic challenge and rising political discontent.

As mentioned, the INF treaty removes the most threatening forward-deployed first strike weapons, but the USSR could have responded-in-kind instead of taking its bold action to break the escalation/response pattern. It was new political thinking, inconceivable in current Western leaders, which induced the USSR to conclude that there can be no winner in a nuclear arms race, that nuclear bombs have little military utility beyond deterrence (which is actually somewhat enhanced by the reduction in U.S. first strike capability), that maybe anti-communist capitalists tend to respond only to military force, but most people, including "enlightened self interest" capitalists and military realists, respond to efforts to enhance national security and to heal aggravating economic problems by reducing confrontation, militarism, and the risk of nuclear war, recognizing that the real contest in the long run is an economic one to determine which system can best provide for the needs and aspirations of people.

Summary:

1. Militarily the INF pact is not very significant. Nuclear bombs become just a bit more useless. The scenario of a "surgical, decapitating strike" becomes more implausible. Deterrence will continue to prevail as the condition of nuclear stalemate, especially in Europe, which is quite stable in any case. It could lead to greater military significance if it provides a boost to the denuclearization of Europe, and perhaps could lead further to reduction in offensive non-nuclear arms.

2. The risk of nuclear war is reduced a bit. It is a minor reduction in the most critical type of first strike capability, and therefore stabilizing. The pressure to respond with L.O.W. is reduced, and hence so is the risk of accidental nuclear war. The risk of automatic escalation of nuclear war is strategically reduced (next).

3. Strategically, a rung in the ladder of "escalation dominance" and guaranteed escalation from theater to strategic nuclear war is removed. It is one step in the reversal of the game of "nuclear chicken."

4. Politically, it is difficult to assess whether the encouragement from this progress will be stronger than the complacency which might develop as a consequence of the elimination of a visible and highly objectionable target.

5. Psychologically, it is a retreat from "nuclear machismo," "missile envy," and "fathering the unthinkable." It is a step to heal "nuclear insanity." Denial may diminish, allowing the problems to be confronted. "Nuclear anxiety" may wane with perhaps the opposite effect.

6. Ideologically, this puts a severe dent in Cold War arguments which have sustained nuclear escalation for more than four decades. This is judged to be its most significant effect.

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The SS-4s,-5s are inaccurate, single warhead, fixed, liquid-fueled. They have higher accuracy and three warheads (whose total combined yield is less than the previous single warheads). evil empire" is difficult to overestimate. It had been contended that reliance on such a treaty would low+€.'+ÿÿÿÿSR would cheat on the treaty anyway, and that this would threaten national security. Recall how Nixon, ealled himself as such a fanatic anticommunist that he would rather resort to nuclear war than countenance a victory by the Viet Namese.

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