Report from the UN Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development
Roger Dittmann, Ph.D.
Professor of Physics Emeritus
National Coordinator
U.S. Federation of Scholars and Scientists
California State University, Fullerton,
CA92634-6866
(714) 278-3421 or -5810 (fax); RDittmann@Fullerton.edu
The Reagan administration boycotted the UN Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development (UNCRDD) which was held at UN headquarters 24 August to 11 September 1987 (However, five candidates for the U.S. presidency did attend). Perhaps this was a contributing factor in making this the most heavily attended conference in UN history--150 official delegations attended, as well as UN specialized agencies, 183 NGOs (Non-governmental organizations), and intergovernmental organizations. Even Israel and the UK, Reagan's closest allies, attended. Many decided to attend after the announcement of Reagan's boycott. Reagan's argument for boycotting the conference was that progress in one area should not be "held hostage" to the other (there was universal agreement on this point) and, further, that there was no connection between disarmament and development. This latter position succeeded in establishing an adversarial relationship between Reagan and the world community of nations and NGOs. A consensus statement of the world community of nations established a common position on the relationship between disarmament, development and security, a crucial element missing from the title of the conference. 99 official position papers from governments and 20 from NGOs (including the WFSW) were presented. Following the lead of the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, who opened the conference by emphasizing this relationship, most of the official presentations argued vociferously against Reagan's position, repetitively indicating obvious connections:
1) The same nations which met in New Delhi requesting $30 thousand million in annual developmental assistance were themselves spending $90 thousand million on military expenditures. Diverting these military funds to development could directly and immediately provide three times as much as requested for development.
2) Industrialized nations have internal problems of underdevelopment as well, as indicated by poverty, homelessness, and other indices. Monies not expended on the military are directly and immediately available for internal development. A consensus was achieved in viewing development as a global issue and as a priority for all countries.
3) Military expenditures are used to sabotage development either through direct attack and destruction, or by requiring threatened countries to divert economic effort for defense. McNamara's dream of forcing the USSR to either accept nuclear military inferiority or face economic bankruptcy has been revived with Star Wars. Viet Nam will require decades to recover from the destruction which successfully prevented it (at least in the short term) from becoming a model to be emulated by neighbors . "Low intensity warfare" is the current favored strategy to sabotage development through military means.
4) Disarmament Fund for Development (DFFD). The proposal by the USSR and the socialist countries that disarmament be accompanied by a commitment of a fraction of the money thereby saved for development was Reagan's primary worry. The Socialist countries added impetus to the proposal by committing themselves to contribute such funds, if the West would cooperate. The USSR also called for a Special Session on Disarmament and Development of the Security Council. Neither proposal achieved the consensus necessary for inclusion in the final document, although "They reaffirm(ed) the international commitment to allocate a portion of the resources released through disarmament,...with a view to bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries".
Usually antisocial activity is discouraged by fines, fees, and taxes, while socially constructive activity is subsidized, so there remain some reservations about a proposal which requires nations to pay a fee if they disarm, but overall, and understandably, the Socialist Countries proposal met with an enthusiastic reception, especially among developing nations. It was a diplomatic success which put the NATO and OECD nations on the defensive, as they remained throughout the conference. They seemed intent on keeping the world safe for them, but not safe from them. A consensus was achieved in recognizing the relationship between disarmament, development, and security in a global context.
The NATO nations engaged in damage control measures--Canada tried to delete language which adjudged the world to be overarmed by suggesting that a statement that a "significant" amount is spent on arms be substituted. On the one action item on the agenda, the Disarmament Fund for Development, they succeeded in diluting it to a statement that such a fund would be "considered".
The conference was preceded by an NGO Conference in Sweden in May 1987 (at which the WFSW was represented by Yuri Alexeev), by several meetings of the 54 member Preparatory Committee, and by meetings of a panel of Eminent Persons from 14 nations. The Heritage Foundation, in its broadside attack against the Conference, claimed (falsely) that the U.S. was excluded from this committee, ignoring the presence of Lawrence Klein from the University of Pennsylvania, Nobel Laureate in Economics.
Official governmental positions were presented during plenary sessions of the conference while parallel sessions of the Committee of the Whole and of three Working Committees were conducted simultaneously. Attendance at the plenary session in the General Assembly hall dwindled as formal presentations of official positions became repetitive in their content, although the number of ways military waste can be compared to development potential are limitless, as are the examples of arguments against Reagan's view that there exists no relationship between disarmament and development. The seriousness with which the socialist countries took the conference, as part of an overall "peace initiative," was indicated by the constant presence of at least two representatives from the USSR, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and most other socialist countries not only at the Plenary Session but at the three simultaneous Working Groups and the Committee of the Whole. It was before the 150 official delegations on the Committee of the Whole that 20 of the 183 NGOs made formal presentations. The Working Groups covered "The relationship between disarmament and development"; "Implications of military expenditures" (to which the WFSW paper on "The Social and Economic Implications of the Arms Race" was submitted); and "Ways and means of releasing resources through disarmament". It was before the third Working Group, chaired by Paul Bamela Engo of the Cameroon, that the proposals for concrete action were submitted (without achieving consensus).
The concept of national sovereignty was treated with sacrosanct reverence in the Draft Final Conference Document. "The judgement as to the level of arms essential for its security" was claimed to rest "with each nation individually." "...(V)iolation...of national sovereignty, and encroachment of the right of all nations to pursue their economic and social development free from outside interference" were claimed to "constitute some of the military threats to international peace and security today." Upon prodding by the WFSW, some of the NGOs convened to critique the Draft Final Document. The world community has already condemned apartheid and racist forms of development. Some types of egregious weapons are already banned by international treaty. The NGOs suggested language reflecting the limitations of international law, norms, and values on national sovereignty.
The insistence on consensus prevented any specific proposals for action from being adopted, but the conference can be judged a great diplomatic success in that a consensus position of the world community of nations on the issue of disarmament, development and security was accomplished. It also served to emphasize Reagan's isolation in the world. He may refuse to accept the conclusions of a conference in which he did not participate (because he boycotted it), but the world seems prepared to continue without him.
Proposals to Implement the Goals of the UN Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development
24 August-11 September 1987
Submitted by Professor Roger Dittmann, representing the World Federation of Scientific Workers
Overall Goal: Reduction of the diversion of developmental resources (for the implementation of a New International Economic Order) into military expenditures.
Preamble: While a few underdeveloped nations spend an inordinate proportion of their limited resources on unnecessary military expenditures, an overwhelming share of the world military budget is spent by the industrialized nations. It has been repeatedly emphasized that destructive military expenditures are diverted from pressing social needs. These effects are documented in the paper which the WFSW has submitted to this conference, "New Economic and Social Implications of the Arms Race--Dangers and Challenges." While it is true that there are severe social problems in the industrialized countries, the most egregious social conditions exist in what are euphemistically called "the developing countries," even though many of them have been suffering disdevelopment, impoverishment, and immiseration. While a cessation of the diversion of social resources to the military could ameliorate conditions in all countries, it would not of itself automatically result in the availability of developmental assistance to the poor nations. The nations with the most tanks generally have the most tractors.
It seemed then appropriate to try to suggest concrete measures which would 1)reduce the need for arms by establishing an International Security System, 2)discourage arms expenditures, and 3)concomitantly provide funds for both the International Security System and for the establishment of a New International Economic Order. Some of the proposals are mild reforms which may not experience intense opposition, but long term, principled, almost utopian proposals are not excluded. Many of the changes, it can be argued, are vitally necessary for survival. It remains to be seen whether humanity can muster the political will to make these, or similar changes. Little prospect for immediate acceptance, given the state of the world, has not been used as an excuse to exclude progressive proposals. Fundamental changes take some time and effort, but let us continue.