John Searle: What's Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind?
[Handout #12]

§ The Solution to the Mind/body Problem:

"biological naturalism": mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain.

§ Two Assumptions underneath Materialism:

(1) they represent the only scientifically acceptable alternatives to the antiscientism that went with traditional dualism, the belief in the immortality of the soul, spiritualism, and so on.

(2) they really think there is some more or less clear meaning attaching to the archaic vocabulary of "dualism," "monism," "materialism," "physicalism," etc., and that the issue have to be posed and resolved in these terms.

Searle: To show that both assumptions are mistaken.

§ Six Unlikely Theories of Mind

(1) Eliminative Materialism: mental states don't exist.  
Feyerabend, Rorty  
(2) Folk psychology is simply and entirely false.  
Stich, Churchland  
(3) Functionalism  
Putnam, Fodor  
(4) Strong Artificial Intelligence (computer functionalism)  
(5) There are no real, intrinsic, subjective, psychological phenomena. Our vocabulary like "beliefs," "desire," etc. is just a manner of speaking.  
(6) Consciousness is to be defined by publicly observable third-person phenomena.

§ Searle's Claims:

(1) Consciousness does matter. There is no way to study the phenomena of the mind without implicitly or explicitly studying consciousness.
(2) Not all of reality is objective; some of it is subjective. In general mental states have an irreducibly subjective ontology.
(3) It is a mistake to suppose that the methodology of a science of the mind must concern itself only with objectively observable behavior.
(4) It is a mistake to suppose that we know of the existence of mental phenomena in others only by observing their behavior.
(5) Behavior or causal relations to behavior are not essential to the existence of mental phenomena.
(6) It is inconsistent with what we in fact know about the universe and our place in it to suppose that everything is knowable by us.
(7) The Cartesian conception of the physical, the conception of physical reality as extended things, is simply not adequate to describe the facts that correspond to statements about physical reality.