Kim: Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strict Laws' Save Anomalous Monism?  
[Handout #14]

§ 1. The Main Dispute  
___ Does AM ensure the causal efficacy of mental properties?

§ 2. Epiphenomenalism

Two claims:  
(1) AM + P entails the causal inertness of mental properties, and  
(2) AM + P fails to provide mental properties with a causal role.

Davidson: (1) is false.  
Kim: (2) is true.

§ 3. Causal Relations

Davidson: Causation as an extensional binary relation whose relata are concrete events ('no matter how described')

Kim: Causal relation obtains between a pair of events because they are events of certain kinds, or have certain properties.

§ 4. Psycho-Physical Supervenience without Psycho-Physical Laws

Davidson: supervenience ---\rightarrow e has a mental property p and e has physical properties Qs, such that if e did not have p, e would not have Qs.  
But not: supervenience ---\rightarrow if another event g does not have p, then g would not have Qs.

Supervenience (Kim):  
___ whenever anything has mental property M there is some physical property Q such that it has Q and everything that has Q has M.

Q: Between Davidson and Kim, who is right?

[same physical properties \rightarrow same mental properties  
\sim same mental properties \rightarrow \sim same physical properties]  

§ 5. Causal Relevance and Causal Efficacy
"causal relevance" -- A property $p$ is \textit{causally relevant} if and only if

(i) $p$ is causally efficacious; or

(ii) $p$ makes a difference to $q$ \textit{and} $q$ is causally efficacious.

"causal efficacy" -- A property $p$ is \textit{causally efficacious} if and only if $p$ is instantiated by event $c$ \textit{and} $p$ plays a causal role in the causation 'c causes e'.

$\Rightarrow$ Supervenience shows that mental properties may be \textit{causally relevant} but they are not causally efficacious.

§ 6. Non-Strict Psycho-Physical Laws

Davidson: Psycho-physical laws are \textit{not} strict.

Fodor: Let $F$ stand for some mental property and let $G$ stand for some physical property of the body:

(i) 'F-events cause G-events' is \textit{not} a strict law; but

(ii) F-events cause G-events, \textit{ceteris paribus} is a strict law.

(iii) Where $C_1, \ldots, C_m$ are the \textit{ceteris paribus} conditions, we get a \textit{disjunctive} law like

(L): 'Under $C_1^*, \ldots, C_m^*$, F events cause G-events', where $C_i^*$ satisfies $C_i$, and (L) is \textit{strict}.

Kim: Davidson's view and Fodor's view are incompatible.

* [Davidson's Argument Against Strict Psycho-Physical Laws] (according to Kim):

___ (1) The mental domain and the physical domain are each governed by their own special synthetic a priori constitutive constraints,

___ (2) But if there are strict laws connecting the two realms, then one could be reduced to the other and each domain cannot retain its own integrity.

___ (3) Therefore, there cannot be laws connecting the mental realm and the physical realm.

* Kim's criticism:

___ It isn't clear why this argument doesn't ban non-strict laws as well.

§ 7. The Problems with 'Non-Strict Psycho-Physical Laws'

[I] the problem of exclusion: $M_1 \neq P_1$ (not reducible to)
Q: What causal work is there for M to do?

[II] the problem of reductionism

What's wrong with non-strict psycho-physical laws as 'bridge' laws?

§ Kim’s Conclusion:

If Davidson maintains that there are non-strict psycho-physical laws, then he may have to give up the "anomaly" of the mental.