[Introduction]

I. Language and the World
   ___ How does language depict reality? Does reality have the same structure as the
   structure of language? For instance, the basic linguistic structure is a subject and a
   predicate, and the basic structure of the world is a particular and a universal (e.g.
   “Socrates is wise”). The subject usually is something of the world and we describe some
   property it has or does not have. A is F is true is A is really F, is false when A is not F.

II. Different Elements of Language

   Singular terms: Terms that designate particular things
   Proper names
   Indexicals: now, today, here, I…
   Demonstratives: that, this…
   Pronouns (singular): he, she,…
   Definite descriptions (the so-and-so):
   Indefinite (singular) descriptions (a so-and-so)

   General terms: Terms that designate a kind of things or a certain property
   Mass nouns
      ___ natural kind terms (‘water,’ ‘tiger,’ ‘lemon’)
      ___ non-natural kind terms (‘bachelor’, ‘contract,’ ‘chair’)
   Adjectives (predicates): colors, shapes, etc.

III. Traditional Theories of Meaning Prior to Frege

[A] The Ideational Theory
   ___ The meaning of a linguistic expression is the speaker’s idea that is associated with
   the expression.

[B] Mill’s Theory [the Object Theory]
   ___ The meaning of a singular term is the thing designated by that term;
   ___ the meaning of a name is just what the name stands for; the name does not have any
   other meaning
   e.g. ‘Socrates’ means Socrates
   e.g. ‘Dartmouth’
   e.g. ‘Johnson’
   ___ The reasons people have for giving a name does not constitute the meaning of that
   name. A name is like a “tag” or a “label” onto a thing.
[Frege’s Theory]

(1) Frege’s Criticism of the Ideational Theory

[The Publicity Requirement]
___ Meaning must be sharable, objective and communicative; i.e., it must be public.

* The Ideational theory fails to meet this requirement. But the Millian view seems to meet it.

(2) Frege’s Criticism of the Millian View

[The Puzzle of Identity]

On Mill’s theory, the meaning of the name is simply its object. Thus, there is no difference in (i) and (ii):

(i) Cicero = Cicero  \[a = a\]
(ii) Cicero = Tully  \[a = b\]

Q: What is an identity statement?
___ a statement concerning the equality between two objects
___ a statement concerning self-identity
___ a statement concerning co-referential relations of two names

* Frege’s Argument against Mill
1. On Mill’s theory, the meaning of a sentence is composed of the meaning of its parts.
2. On Mill’s theory, the meaning of a name is just its object.
3. Since Cicero = Tully, the two names mean the same.
4. Therefore, the meaning of (i) = the meaning of (ii)
5. But the meaning of (i) ≠ the meaning of (ii)
6. Therefore, Mill’s theory must be wrong.

[The Problem of Substitution of Co-referential Names]

Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens. [T]
Mark Twain is the author of *Tom Sawyer*. [T]
Leibniz’s Law: \(x = y\), then \(Fx \rightarrow Fy\)
Samuel Clemens is the author of *Tom Sawyer*. [T]

Jackie believes that Mark Twain is the author of *TS*. [T]
Leibniz’s Law: \(x = y\), then \(Fx \rightarrow Fy\)
Jackie believes that Samuel Clemens is the author of *TS*. [F]
(3) Frege’s Theory

1. There must be additional information contributed by the names to the meaning of the sentences.

Q: What is the additional information given by names?

2. The different ways of knowing or getting to the object are the “senses” of the names.

→ “modes of presentation”

e.g. Hesperus is Phosphorus (The Morning Star is the Evening Star).

e.g.
   (a) B. J. Ortcutt is Ralph’s next door neighbor.
   (b) The man wearing a hat = the man on the beach = Ralph’s next door neighbor = B. J. Ortcutt.
   (c) Ralph believes that the man wearing a hat is a spy.
   (d) But: Ralph does not believe that his next door neighbor is a spy.

* Question: What is a mode of presentation? How is it established?

3. A name stands for (designates) its referent. A name expresses its sense.

4. Name mediated by Referent (object)

   [Sense]:
   A definite description that picks out the referent of the name
   ↓
   Description Theory of Names

5. Speaker A sense 1 Referent
   Speaker B sense 2 Referent
6. The sense of a name carries the “cognitive value” of the name. The sense of the whole sentence is called ‘Thought’ (or ‘proposition’) by Frege. _____ the explanation for the substitution failures in belief context.

**[Frege’s Argument]:**

1. Two propositions, p and q, are the same if they carry the same cognitive value such that for everyone, p and q express the same thing.
2. But someone could consent to "the morning star is a body illuminated by the sun" while denying that "the evening star is a body illuminated by the sun," even though the two terms "the morning star" and "the evening star" have the same reference.
3. Therefore, "the morning star is a body illuminated by the sun" and "the evening star is a body illuminated by the sun" do not have the same cognitive value; hence, they do not express the same proposition.

7. A sentence in indirect discourse designates a proposition. Substitution can only preserve truth value in indirect discourse when one proposition is replaced by another one with the same cognitive value.

8. **Publicity Requirement:**
   ___ Thought and sense are sharable (but not necessarily shared) in that we can grasp what others associate with the term/sentence.

**[Summary of the Description Theory (Descriptivism) of names]:**

___ Descriptions associated with names by speakers give the meanings of names, and/or determine (fix) their referents (in the actual world; in any arbitrary world-state).
___ The meaning of a name is its sense, which is a mode of representation of the object (the referent).
___ Reference is mediated by the sense or the description the speaker associates with the name.

§ **Supplement: Frege on Reference of A Sentence**

- All true sentences have the same reference, and all false sentences have the same reference.
- Knowledge lies in the proposition together with its reference, i.e., its truth-value.
- Judgment is a movement from a proposition to its reference, i.e., its truth-value.
- The truth-value of a sentence, which contains another sentence as a part, must remain unaltered when we substitute for the part another of the same truth-value.
- A sentence in direct discourse designates a sentence, but in indirect discourse, it designates a proposition (a Thought). Frege’s point is that in indirect discourses, we do not have the customary reference; we only have indirect reference – which is the sense for a singular term, or a proposition for a sentence.