§ Russell’s Theory of Universals (a la Plato)

[Russell’s first argument for universals]: (p. 45)
1. All just acts must all, in some sense, partake of a common nature, which will be found in whatever is just and in nothing else.
2. This common nature, in virtue of which they are all just, will be justice itself, the pure essence the admixture of which with facts of ordinary life produces the multiplicity of just acts.
3. Therefore, there is a universal of JUSTICE, which is shared by all particular just acts (and just people).
4. Therefore, universals must all exist on their own.

* Language and Reality

Words denote things in the world, and these things are divided into particulars and universals.

1. No sentence can be made up without at least one word which denotes a universal.
2. Even verbs denote universals, e.g., ‘like’.
3. Thus all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals.

Russell: “Seeing that nearly all the words to be found in the dictionary stand for universals, it is strange that hardly anybody except students of philosophy ever realizes that there are such entities as universals…. We feel such words to be incomplete and insubstantial; they seem to demand a context before anything can be
done with them. Hence we succeed in avoiding all notice of universals as such, until
the study of philosophy forces them upon our attention.”

“Even among philosophers, … those [universals] named by verbs and prepositions
have been usually overlooked.”

_____ Q: Do you think verbs and prepositions denote universals?

[Russell’s second argument for universals (as relations)]: (p. 48)
1. If we begin with a particular shape such as triangle or a particular color such
   as ‘white’, and we want to learn how to apply this term to another shape, we
   must see that the other shape resemble this particular triangle or whiteness.
2. We must therefore specify the right sort of resemblance to use in our
   comparison.
3. Since there are many white things, the resemblance must hold between many
   pairs of particular white things.
4. If resemblance holds between many pairs of particular things, then there
   must be a universal RESEMBLANCE.
5. Therefore, there must be some true universals such as RESEMBLANCE.

[Russell’s third argument for universals (as non-mental): (p. 49)
1. When we apprehend a truth, we do not cause of the truth of the proposition
   by coming to know it.
2. In the example, ‘Edinburgh is north of London,’ the part of the earth’s
   surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London
   stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south,
   and even if there were no minds at all in the universe.
3. The truth contains a universal relation ‘is north of.’
4. If the truth is not mental, then the universal cannot be mental either.
5. Therefore, universals are not mere mental creations; they are not dependent
   on thought.
6. Therefore, universals must belong to the independent world which thought
   apprehends but does not create.

§ Summary: [Russell’s definition of ‘universal’]
1. A universal is the pure essence which all particular things have in common;
   it is the pure essence or the common nature of particular things. It is what
   Plato calls an ‘idea’ or ‘form’.
2. A universal cannot exist in the world of sense; it is not fleeting or changeable
   like the things of sense: it is eternally itself, immutable and indestructible.
3. A universal cannot be given to us in sensation, since whatever is given in
   sensations is a particular.
4. A universal is not merely mental; whatever being belongs to them is
   independent of their being thought of or in any way apprehended by minds.
5. A universal is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it
   is something.
6. Thoughts and feelings, minds and physical objects exist; but universals do not exist in this sense. We shall say that they subsist or have being, where ‘being’ is opposed to ‘existence’ as being timeless.

7. Therefore, the world of universals may also be described as the world of being.

8. The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, whereas the world of existence is fleeting, vague, fuzzy, without any clear plan or arrangement.

9. Both worlds are real and both are important to the metaphysician.

§ Russell’s View of Our Knowledge of Universals

[three kinds of knowledge]
   a) knowledge by acquaintance
   b) knowledge by description only
   c) knowledge by both acquaintance and description

* knowledge by acquaintance of universals
   ___ sense data: white, red, black, sweet, sour, loud, hard, etc.
   ___ relations of space and time (of which we may be immediately aware) such as ‘to the left of’; resemblance; similarity, etc. (Our knowledge of such relations, though it requires more power of abstraction than is required for perceiving the qualities of sense-data, appears to be equally immediate, and equally indubitable.)

Q: How do we know if our knowledge is true?
   ____ (p. 53) Discuss: “As soon as we see what the proposition means, even if we do not yet know whether it is true or false, it is evident that we must have acquaintance with whatever is really dealt with by the proposition. By applying this test, it appears that many propositions which might seem to be concerned with particulars are really concerned only with universals.”

* a priori knowledge
   ___ The difference between an a priori general proposition and an empirical generalization does not come in the meaning of the proposition, it comes in the nature of the evidence for it. In the empirical case, the evidence consists in the particular instances. All a priori knowledge deals exclusively with relations of universals. (e.g. ‘All men are morals’ – empirical or a priori?)

* Knowledge of physical objects
   ___ Knowledge of physical objects, as opposed to sense-data, is only obtained by an inference.
   ___ We do not have direct acquaintance with physical objects themselves.
   ___ Hence we cannot give instances of the actual physical objects; we can only give instances of the associated sense-data.
Hence our knowledge as to physical objects depends throughout upon this possibility of general knowledge where no instance can be given. The same applies to our knowledge of other minds, etc.

§ A Survey of our Knowledge

knowledge of things

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<tr>
<th>immediate</th>
<th>acquaintance</th>
<th>particulars</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>derivative</td>
<td>description = acquaintance + knowledge of truth</td>
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knowledge of truths

<table>
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<tr>
<th>immediate</th>
<th>intuitive</th>
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<td>derivative = self-evident truth + deduction</td>
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All our knowledge of truth depends upon our intuitive knowledge. Knowledge of things, on the other hand, depends on knowledge by acquaintance.

(p. 56) Discuss: “But knowledge of truths raises a further problem, which does not arise in regard to knowledge of things, namely the problem of error. Some of our beliefs turn out to be erroneous, and therefore it becomes necessary to consider how we can distinguish knowledge from error. This problem does not arise with regard to knowledge by acquaintance, for whatever may be the object of acquaintance, even in dreams and hallucinations, there is no error involved so long as we do not go beyond the immediate object: error can only arise when we regard the immediate object, i.e., the sense-datum, as the mark of some physical object. Thus the problems connected with knowledge of truths are more difficult than those connected with knowledge of things.”

§ Ramsey’s Critique of Russell

Russell assumes a distinction between universals and particulars, but such a distinction is due to mistaking for a fundamental characteristic of reality what is merely a characteristic of language.

It is hard to see any ground for making the distinction between universals and particulars.

(p. 63) Discuss: Wittgenstein: “the thing is independent, in so far as it can occur in all possible circumstances, but this form of independence is a form of connection with the atomic fact, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to occur in two different ways, alone and in the proposition.)”

Q: Is it because there is a distinction in reality between particulars and universals that we introduce the grammatical distinction between subjects and predicates, or is
it because we have such a grammatical distinction that we come to make a
distinction between universals and particulars?

e. g. :‘Socrates’ and ‘wise’ are not the names of objects but incomplete symbols.

§ Ramsey’s Argument

1. ‘Socrates is wise’ and ‘Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates’ are but two ways
to assert the same fact, express the same proposition.
2. In one sentence, ‘Socrates’ is the subject while ‘wise’ is the predicate; in the
other, ‘wisdom’ is the subject while ‘Socrates’ is the predicate.
3. But the distinction is only a matter for grammarians; it has nothing to do with the
logical nature of Socrates or wisdom.
4. Hence, there is no fundamental classification of objects on the basis of the
distinction between subjects and predicates.

(p. 73) Discuss: “…this difference between Socrates and wise is illusory, because it
can be shown to be theoretically possible to make a similar narrower range for
Socrates.… Once this fact is observed, the difference between Socrates and wise
lapses, and we begin, like Whitehead, to call Socrates an adjective.”

§ Ramsey’s Conclusion

The mistake of Russell is to miss the distinction between functions: some are used as
names and some are used as incomplete symbols. The failure to make this
distinction has led to these functional symbols, some of which are names and some
incomplete, being treated all alike as names of incomplete objects or properties, and
is responsible for that great muddle the theory of universals.

Review Questions:

1. How does Russell argue that there are universals both for properties and for
relations, and that these universals can be named either by adjectives or by
verbs and prepositions? Give your evaluations of his arguments for
universals.
2. What is Russell’s view on our knowledge of physical objects? How is it
connected to his theory of universals?
3. How does Ramsey criticize Russell’s distinction between universals and
particulars? Do you agree with Ramsey that there is no fundamental
metaphysical distinction between the two, and all there is are simply
distinctions we make in grammar?
§ Study Questions for Essay 3:

1. What does Armstrong mean by the principle of instantiation? Under this principle, what is his theory of universals?

2. What does Armstrong mean by “states of affairs”? Try to use your own words to explain it.

3. Read only sections #1 and 2 in Daly: What are the definitions of “trope” (Daly, section #2)? What is a trope in your understanding (after reading the section)?